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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of a balanced budget fiscal policy expansion in a 
regional context within a numerical dynamic general equilibrium model. We take 
Scotland as an example where, recently, there has been extensive debate on greater 
fiscal autonomy, and where balanced budget fiscal expansion is feasible under 
currently devolved powers.  In response to a balanced budget fiscal expansion the 
model suggests that: an increase in current government purchase in goods and services 
has negative multiplier effects only if the elasticity of substitution between private and 
public consumption is high enough to move downward the marginal utility of private 
consumers; public capital expenditure crowds in consumption and investment but 
crowding out effects might arise in the short-run if agents are myopic. The distinctive 
results for public capital expenditure suggest that the current restriction on the 
composition of Scottish government expenditures is a very significant one. 
 
JEL Classifications: C68, D58, H71, H72, R13, R50. 
Key words: regional computable general equilibrium analysis, fiscal federalism, fiscal 
policy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Scotland is engaged in a lively and on-going debate on greater fiscal autonomy and 
independence, which is politically controversial, especially in respect of tax-varying 
powers. The Scottish Parliament has the power to make a balanced-budget adjustment 
in public expenditure by varying the basic rate of income tax. However, this power has 
not so far been used. Thus, the object of this paper is to explore and quantify a number 
of typical balanced-budget government spending shocks. To this end, we use an 
intertemporal variant of AMOS1 a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for 
Scotland. 
 
Several empirical and analytical macroeconomic models, mostly related with the macro-
national literature, have tried to identify the possible effects of fiscal expansion (e.g., 
Aiyagari et al., 1992, Campbell, 1994, Baxter and King, 1993, Devereux et al., 1996, 
Perotti, 1999, Blanchard and Perotti, 2002, Chen, 2007). However, there is still no clear 
consensus about the impact of an expansionary fiscal policy2. 
 
In a single region or sub-national context, very few studies attempted to analyse the 
macroeconomic effect of fiscal policy. Previous contributions to fiscal federalism 
mostly adopt a micro-perspective based on the assumption of the neutral regional macro 
impact of fiscal autonomy, neglecting the system wide impact of regional policy 
(McGregor and Swales, 2005). Here we seek to draw on lessons from recent 
macroeconomic analyses of fiscal policy, but we adapt them to an explicitly regional 
context. The regional dimension of the analysis is captured through application to a 
regional economy characterised by: highly open goods markets in which import and 
export to GDP ratios are much higher than for the national economy; labour markets are 
                                                             
1 AMOS is an acronym for a macro-micro model of Scotland parameterised on Scottish data: the Social 
Accounting Matrix for the year 2004. The model employed here is an intertemporal variant (Lecca et al, 
2010) of the basic AMOS CGE framework (Harrigan et al, 1991). 
2 An extensive literature on fiscal consolidation can be found in Birotti (2005) 
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highly open characterised by the presence of migration and, potentially, influenced by 
national and regional wage bargaining institutions; financial markets are perfectly 
integrated with the national economy with which the region shares a permanently fixed 
exchange rate. Furthermore, the macroeconomic “closures” of the model are those 
appropriate to a region, reflecting an institutional structure in which regions are not 
directly responsible for national debt, and where the system of national transfers 
moderates the operation of regional adjustment mechanisms. 
 
We carry out a number of experiments using a CGE model that shares some similarities 
with previous business cycle models, as far as the forward looking dynamic structure is  
concerned. An important difference is our models of wage setting and allowance for 
migration. The traditional intertemporal model is augmented with imperfectly 
competitive features in the labour market and a net-migration model. Unlike the 
standard model that allows for substitution between consumption and leisure where the 
representative consumer chooses the quantity of labour to supply according to a flexible 
nominal wage, our model contains a wage bargaining function sensitive to the 
movement of the unemployment rate and labour supply increases through population 
due to in-migration. The regional wage bargaining and migration effects are crucial for 
the analysis of peripheral and indeed all sub-national regions of the EU. 
  
Initially we investigate the response of an increase in current public purchase of goods 
allowing imperfect substitution between public and private consumption. Then, we 
consider the case of an increase in public investment. The results of our simulation 
experiment suggest that an increase in current government purchase in goods and 
services has negative multiplier effects only if the elasticity of substitution between 
private and public consumption is high enough to move downward the marginal utility 
of private consumers. This result is in line with the theoretical findings present in 
Linnemann and Schabert (2002). The impact of an unanticipated public capital 
expenditure shock, in the short and in the long-run, has a positive effect on private 
consumption and investment. The short-run dramatically diverges for the case in which 
agents have myopic expectations, under which circumstances there is complete 
crowding out. 
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The paper proceeds as follow. In section 2 and 3, we outline the dynamic general 
equilibrium model used in this study and in Section 4 outlines the simulation strategy. 
Section 5, 6 and 7 are dedicated to the discussion of the policy shocks. Concluding 
remarks are in section 8. 
 
2. Key model features 
 
Three domestic transactor groups are incorporated: households, corporations and 
government; and in this application eleven commodities and activities3. Consumption 
and investment decisions reflect intertemporal optimization with perfect foresight. Real 
government expenditure is divided into current and capital expenditure. While the 
former are treated as purchases of goods and services, the latter are explicitly considered 
as public investment in infrastructure. For a balanced budget fiscal expansion, the local 
labour income tax is endogenous. In the subsequent subsections we outline briefly the 
model. The mathematical presentation of the model is kept to a minimum as further 
details can be found in Lecca et al. (2011a). 
 
Consumers 
 
Household optimises its lifetime utility function of effective consumption
t
C
~
, which 
takes the following form: 
  















1
1
~
1
1
1
0
t
t
t
C
U ; (1) 
 
where and  are respectively the constant elasticity of marginal utility and the 
constant rate of time preference. Following recent analytical contributions on fiscal 
spending, in particular the work of Linnemann et al, (2004), the consumption bundle 
                                                             
3 Agriculture, forestry & fishing, (AGR), Mining (MIN), Manufacturing (MAN), Energy and water 
(ENE), Construction (CON), Distribution & catering (DIS), Transport & communication (TRA), Finance 
and business (FIN), Public admin etc. (PAD), Education, health and social work (EDU) and Other 
services (OTH).   
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C
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is defined as a CES combination over private consumption, C, and current public 
expenditure, 
i
G : 
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Using this formulation Linnemann et al, (2004) show that if the elasticity of substitution 

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1
1
 is sufficiently low, an increase in government purchases in goods and 
services can raise the marginal utility of private consumption and counteract the 
negative wealth effect on consumption due to an increase in taxation. 
The present value of consumption must not exceed total wealth, W. In our configuration 
we distinguish between financial wealth (FW) and non-financial wealth (NFW), such 
that 
ttt
FWNFWW  and in which: 
 
ttttt SFWrFW   1)1(  (3) 
ttt
s
ttttt
TrfwuLNFWrNFW 

)1()1()1(
1

 (4) 
 
In equation (3), 
t
Π  and 
t
S  are respectively capital income and saving. The variables 
,,
t
s
t
wL ut, tTrf and t  in equation (4) are respectively working population, nominal wage 
rate before tax, the unemployment rate, the rate of income tax and  net transfers from 
other sectors. 
 
Once the optimal path of consumption is obtained, the aggregate consumption is 
allocated within each period t, for the i commodities. 
 
Firms  
 
Total gross output X, is given by combining value added (Y) and intermediate inputs (V) 
through Leontief technology:  
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where aY and aV are input coefficients. Y is given by a CES combination of labour 
demand ( dL ), private capital ( dK ) and public capital services (K
d
(g)) :  
 
  
1
),(,,, tg
d
iti
d
iti
d
iiti
KbLbKaY   (6) 
 
Where 
i
  is a scale parameter and given   the elasticity of substitution, 
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 is treated as an unpaid factor of production that is considered exogenous to the 
firm and determined by the public stock of infrastructure
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through capital government expenditure
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Modelling congestion effects  
 
To allow for congestion effects and to take into account the degree of non-publicness of 
public goods (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973), public capital stock and current 
government expenditure are adjusted following a simple model consistent with median 
voter demand studies (see Edwards, 1990 and Fisher and Turnovsky, 1998). The 
congestion model we use follows the traditional formulation of decreasing marginal 
congestion. The aggregate public capital service is adjusted for congestion by private 
capital stock, K , and population,
s
L
4:   
                                                             
4 In some studies which hold labour supply fixed, public capital is congested only by private capital 
(Barro and Sala I Martin, 1993 and Fisher and Turnovsky, 1998). Other formulations may imply 
congestion only if population increases (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973 and Edwards, 1990) or by 
employment and private capital (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1993). Since the model used here allows for 
unemployment, public capital is congested by private capital and total labour force (which includes the 
unemployed). In the model we are assuming that all population is working-age population. So we use 
labour force and population as synonymous. 
7 
 
 
 ss
g
d
g
LKKK 
)()(                    


1
 , ),0(      ).1,0(  (8) 
where,   is the congestion parameter. The increase in private capital and population 
reduce the effective quantity of public capital stock enjoyable by all firms and the 
magnitude of this effect depends on the level of . When  01    we have the case 
of a pure public good, which is available equally to each firm and its use would not 
reduce its usefulness to others. In this case the public capital service is non-rival and 
non-excludable as defined by Samuelson (1954) and firms enjoy full benefits from its 
use. If )1(5.0    public capital still remains non-excludable but loses the property 
of non-rivalry5. The quantity of public services available to a producer declines if 
capital and working population increase. The higher is the use of private factors the 
lower is the contribution of public capital in production. Such a crowding effect is 
stronger the lower is   which has the smallest value where there is a situation of “over-
crowding” (Edwards, 1990) such that the decline in public services is faster than the 
increase in growth.  
The representative firm considers public capital as exogenous and the path of private 
investment is obtained by maximizing the present value of the firm‟s cash flow: 
Max 
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The cash flow is given by profit, 
t
 , less private investment expenditure,  It, subject to 
the presence of adjustment cost  
t
g   where 
ttt
KI / : 
 
Government  
 
As we have said above we distinguish between two kinds of government expenditures: 
G and )( gI . Government keeps a balanced budget year to year, so that government 
                                                             
5 This corresponds to the case described in Fisher and Turnovsky, (1998) called proportional congestion. 
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expenditures are entirely financed by distortionary taxation. We consider the case where 
government finance its expenses (current and capital) by raising exclusively the rate of 
tax on labour income, t .  
 
Population and Labour Market 
 
No natural population change is assumed, but the labour force ( sL ) evolves over time 
through migration: 
 
 
11
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t
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mLL  (13) 
where m is net in-migration as a proportion of the regional population which adjusts 
according to the econometrically parameterised regional net migration function reported 
in Layard et al. (1991). The model starts with zero net migration flow and, in any 
period, migration is taken to be positively related to the gap between the log of regional 
 R
t
rw  and national  Nrw  after-tax real wages, and negatively related to the gap 
between the log of national, (uN) and regional unemployment rates, where uN and rwN 
are not time-varying: 
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Wage setting is determined via a regional bargained real wage function that embodies 
the econometrically derived specification given in Layard et al. (1991): 
 
    u c= rw
t
R
t
ln113.0ln   (15) 
 
where c is a calibrated parameter. Thus, in the regional wage bargaining regime (RB), 
the labour market is defined by the wage curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994) 
according to which wages and unemployment are negatively related. Therefore, regional 
wages are directly related to workers‟ bargaining power and respond to excess demand 
for labour.  
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Domestic and imported inputs are obtained via an Armington link (Armington, 1969). 
The demands for Scottish goods are determined via an export demand function 
according to which the quantity of goods exported is related to the relative regional 
price and price elasticity, given constant prices and income for the Rest of UK and the 
Rest of the World.  
 
3. Dataset and model parameterization 
 
The benchmark data set is the Scottish Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the year 
2004 based on the IO Table for 2004 built by the Scottish Government6 to which we 
have added the information related to the primary and secondary income distribution 
using the household‟s disposal income account7. Unfortunately, we do not have data on 
the level of the Scottish public capital stock, so we have to develop a proxy. The 
approach we employ to estimate the government public capital stock is the general 
perpetual inventory method (detailed in Lecca et al. 2011), a well-known methodology 
applied by OECD (2001) and by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (1999)8.  
 
The world interest rate is set to 0.04 (which is faced by producers, consumers and 
investors), the rate of depreciation to 0.1 and the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution 
is equal to 1.2 (Blundell et al., 1994). For all sectors, trade elasticities are set equal to 2 
(Gibson, 1990) whilst production elasticities are equal to 0.3 (Harris, 1989). The wage 
curve elasticity is set to -0.113, whilst in the migration function, we use the elasticities 
econometrically estimated by Layard et al, (1991).  
 
As for the congestion parameter, in other CGE models, as for example in Alonso-
Carrera et al. (2009), the congestion parameter is set equal to 0.36 while three levels of 
congestion parameter (high, medium and low) are analysed in Seung and Kraybill 
(2001). Since we do not have specifically estimated parameters for the Scottish 
economy we prefer, in these circumstances to take the intermediate situation of 
proportional congestion ( 50 . ) as a benchmark. However, we handle the uncertainty 
                                                             
6 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Economy/Input-Output/Downloads 
7 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Economy/SNAP/expstats/GDHI2007 
8 See also Holtz-Eakin 1993 and Kamps, 2004. 
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associated with the value of this parameter in subsequent sections, where a sensitivity 
analysis is carried out on the parameter  . 
 
4. Simulation strategy 
 
According to the 2004 HM Treasure Budget estimate, the amount of revenue that the 
Scottish tax office would be able to collect for one penny rise in the Scottish variable 
tax rate would be approximately £270 million of additional revenue which represent 
1.10% and 12.20% increase in current and capital government expenditure, respectively. 
We separately analyse the effects of 1.10% and 12.20% increase in current and capital 
government expenditure respectively.  
The increase in current government expenditure affects the marginal utility of 
consumption to a degree determined by the elasticity of substitution of the consumption 
bundle defined over private and public consumption. Therefore, our results critically 
depend upon the value assigned to the elasticity of substitution,  .  
 
Many studies estimate the degree of substituibilty between private and public 
consumption (e.g. Kormendi, 1983; Aschauer, 1985; Karras 1994; Ni 1995; Ho, 2001; 
Fleissing and Rossana, 2003) however the estimates found in the literature vary widely 9. 
Moreover, we cannot use previous estimates directly because they are based on 
parametric specifications that are not consistent with our model. Indeed, most of the 
estimates are obtained assuming an intra-temporal linear utility function (such as 
GCC  
~
) whilst our model is assuming that private and public consumption are 
imperfect substitutes, to accommodate the analytical findings of Linnemann and 
Schabert (2002). For this reason we compare three outcomes obtained by imposing 
20 . , 2 and   
 
When we simulate the internally founded 12.20% increase in public investment we set 
  equal to 0.5 and government current consumption does not enter in the consumer‟s 
utility function. 
                                                             
9 Some of them show that substituibility would best describe the relationships between public and private 
spending while others are clearly supporting the case of complementarity. 
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We also show results of a simultaneous increase in current and capital government 
expenditure. At present, the Scottish Parliament does not have complete discretion 
regarding the allocation of the Scottish budget between capital and current spending, 
which is determined by the UK Government (Report on Scottish Devolution, 2009). So, 
according to the Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland (GERS, 2009), only 
12% of the budget is allocated to public capital expenditure while the rest is made up of 
current purchase in goods and services. Here we hypothesize that the increment of 
revenue that would occur by raising the Scottish variable tax of one penny is allocated 
88% to current expenditure and 12% to capital expenditure, which correspond to a 
permanent increase of 1.03% and 1.07% of current and capital expenditure respectively.  
 
All set of shocks are run considering government balanced budget.  So that, income tax 
should rises by the amount necessary to cover the increase in government expenditure. 
 
5.  The impact of a permanent increase in current government spending. 
 
We analyse the effect of 1.10% increase in current government expenditure. Results for 
different values of   are reported in Table 1 where we distinguish between the short-
run (SR) and the long-run (LR) impact. The short-run corresponds to the first period of 
the model where we impose capacity constraints; that is in this time interval the supply 
of all factors of production is fixed. The long-run is the last period of the model where 
we impose steady-state conditions.  
 
Low elasticity of substitution ( 20 . ) 
 
For the case of 20 . , the increase in government purchases raises the marginal utility 
of consumption that counteracts the negative wealth effect, producing a general 
expansion in regional activity.  
 
In the short run a positive impact on output is accompanied by a rise in investment 
(0.56%) and consumption (0.77%). The replacement cost of capital is above its 
12 
 
benchmark equilibrium (0.08%) because of capital constraints. The labour force is 
fixed, though labour demand rises because aggregate demand expands, reducing the 
unemployment rate (-1.70%). Consequently, the bargaining power of workers increases 
and so does the real wage (pre-tax, 0.43% and after-tax, 0.19%).  
 
Over time the behaviour of both migration and investment allow total output to rise 
further. The rise in the real take home wage and the fall in the unemployment rate result 
in an increase in population. In turn, the growth in labour supply eases the pressure on 
the wage until the real post tax wage is restored to its original level. Capital stock 
expands, driven by increases in investment.  
 
The demand side effect of government purchases is reinforced by an increase in the 
individual‟s marginal utility that increases consumption offsetting the adverse (supply) 
effects of an increase in taxation and real labour cost. So the crowding in effect upon 
private consumption acts as a (demand side) counterbalancing stimulus to profitability 
thereby raising investment demand and then capital stocks.  
 
In the model, exports are price sensitive. The increase in regional prices generated by 
the demand shock, through a rise in the nominal wage, has an adverse effect on 
competitiveness. However, the contraction in RUK and ROW exports, in the short and 
long run are not enough to offset total output, because production is supported by 
domestic consumption that stimulates domestic output.  
 
High elasticity of substitution ( 2 ) 
 
When the elasticity of substitution is set to a high value, output, employment and 
consumption decline in the long run. The results are compatible to a degree with 
previous business cycle models. Here the positive demand-side effect of an increase in 
government purchases is unable to outweigh the adverse supply-side effects of an 
increase in taxation that is made worse by the decline in consumption. In this scenario 
although government expenditure enters individuals‟ utility functions, the marginal 
utility of consumption is prevented from rising by the high degree of substitution 
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between private and public consumption. Since nominal and real wages rise so as to 
restore the net of tax wage, Scottish population and employment fall below their initial 
steady state values. 
 
Turning to a sectoral analysis, we see that only Public administration (PAD) and 
Education (EDU) exhibit positive change in activity, in the long run. The intensity of 
government purchases (in the benchmark data) is more marked in PAD and EDU than 
other sectors, so that, the positive demand effect in these sectors is able to produce 
capital expansion. However, this is insufficient to counteract the general contractionary 
effect in all of the other sectors. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the real shadow price 
of capital for all sectors. Note that only for PAD and EDU the shadow price of capital is 
higher than the replacement cost of capital, thus stimulating investment with positive 
effect on output. However, the magnitude of the impact on these sectors is insufficient 
to produce an overall expansionary effect.  
 
Perfect substitution 
 
The results we would expect when the utility function is defined over a consumption 
bundle C
~
 where perfect substitution between private and public consumption is 
imposed (  ) are those where government purchases do not enter in the individual 
utility function.  
 
Figure 2 shows the change in gross domestic product (GDP) and consumption for the 
case where perfect substitution between private and public consumption is imposed and 
the case where government expenditure does not enter in the consumer‟s utility function 
(indicated respectively a and b in the Figure). The change in GDP and consumption 
when   approximates the case in which public spending has no direct impact on 
household utility. From the chart it seems that the percentage changes are almost equal 
in the two cases and will converge in the new steady state.  
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Even in this case the response of an income tax-financed expansion in government 
spending is, both in the short and long-term, contractionary10. As the case of 2 , the 
positive demand effect of an increase in government expenditure is more than totally 
offset by the adverse supply effect that an increase in taxes has on the bargained 
nominal wage and therefore competitiveness. 
 
6. The impact of a permanent increase in public investment. 
 
In this section, we analyse the effect of a 12.2% increase in public investment (which 
correspond to the same amount of a 1.10% increase in government purchase of goods 
and services), again financed by an increase in income taxation. The results are reported 
in the first column of Table 2. 
 
In the short run, given the capacity constraint for private and public factors of 
production, the increase in public investment does not correspond to an expansion in the 
public capital stock by shifting the marginal product schedules, but can be seen as a 
simple stimulus to final demand. Therefore, in this time frame, we can distinguish two 
main simultaneous effects: the positive demand side effect associated with an increase 
in public investment and a negative effect of a resource cost related to an increase in 
taxation expanding the wedge between before and after tax wage.  
 
Our results suggest a negative impact on employment and GDP but a positive impact on 
consumption and investment. In this simulation, therefore, the decline in regional 
activities does not correspond to a reduction in welfare. GDP declines by 0.03% as a 
result of a reduction in employment of 0.07% with respect to the base year. This is the 
result of an increase in the production cost of labour. Indeed, in the regional bargaining 
process, workers make adjustment in their pre-tax income after government expansion, 
which has implied a 1.94% increase in income tax. However, workers are unable to 
claim more, to maintain the same level of purchasing power, so the real wage after tax 
                                                             
10 The sign of the balanced budget multiplier is sensitive to labour market assumptions. Indeed, under a 
fixed nominal pre-tax wage what we would expect is a positive balanced budget multiplier in the short 
and long-run. Further details on this shock can be found in Lecca et al. (2011). 
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declines by 0.06%. With the fall in labour demand, unemployment rises, reducing the 
worker‟s bargaining power and so the real take home wage. Private investment 
expenditures are positively driven by the demand side of the economy. The expected 
future income related to the rise in commodities prices shifts up the real shadow price of 
capital reflecting profitability.  
 
After the first period the situation changes significantly. In addition to the demand 
stimulus of an increase in investment and to a negative supply side effect of the 
distortionary tax, we also have an increase in the public capital stock that produces 
positive supply side effects. All capacity constraints are relaxed allowing public and 
private capital stock to accumulate over time while migration increases the working 
population. Turning to the dynamics in the labour market, (see Figure 3) only after the 
third period does total employment begin to rise. Wages are still high in the first three 
periods so that, we have a positive impact on labour input only at the beginning of 
period forth. The combined effect of a rise in the real wage after tax and reduction in 
unemployment rate encourage in-migration. Simultaneously, in-migration puts 
downward pressure on the real wage which gradually returns to its benchmark value. 
The labour market clears, at this point, where the change in employment equalizes the 
change in working population, and consequently the unemployment rate comes to rest at 
its original position. 
 
From inspection of Figure 4 we can see that consumption increases relative to the initial 
steady state, although the average income tax rate is above its initial equilibrium. This 
reflects the important impact of the public capital stock: it produces a positive supply-
side multiplier, by which increases in capital expenditure and tax rates induce a rise in 
output that in turn does not require additional increases in tax rates. As we can see from 
the chart the change in the average tax rate is positive but its magnitude decreases 
period by period coming to rest gradually at 0.47%. This is not an unexpected result 
since even in the very short-run we were able to see that the output effect of an 
increased public capital stock is able to offset the adverse resource cost effect of 
taxation. In other words, given the nature of public capital stock, its accumulation acts 
as an induced structural change that encourages private factors on the supply side of the 
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economy, which ultimately more than totally mitigates the the distortionary cost of 
taxation.  
 
The representative agent increases investment since the accumulation of public capital 
stock stimulates a strong rise in the marginal product of capital. Furthermore, the 
increase in private capital stock puts downward pressure on the capital rental rate, 
producing a system wide efficiency stimulus lowering commodity prices, which in turn 
puts downward pressure on the replacement cost of capital relative to the change of the 
shadow price of capital, so that Tobin‟s q moves procyclically, ultimately encouraging 
additional investment.  
 
In the long-run, where all factors of production are fully adjusted, private investment 
increases by 0.61%, which is different from the percentage increase in output, implying 
that, the capital coefficient is not the same as the initial steady state. Consumption and 
employment rise by 0.38% and 0.50% respectively.  
 
Given fixed capital stock in the first period,  the short-run results obtained here share 
similar features with the short-run outcomes that corresponds to the scenario where we 
run an increase in current government expenditure where there is no direct effect of 
government expenditure on the marginal utility of private consumers (  ). In both 
cases, and only in the short-run, the experiment is configured as a demand side shock of 
the same magnitude. So, ceteris paribus, we would expect the same short-run outcome 
as the base case, where the demand side effect is not able to offset the negative adverse 
supply side effect of the increase in taxation. However, this expectation is not fulfilled, 
most obviously because consumption and investment are forward looking with rational 
expectations. 
 
Difference between forward looking and myopic agents 
 
17 
 
Thus it seems useful to compare results with that obtained running the model with 
myopic expectations. So that, in Figure 5 we show the evolution of consumption and 
investment for the forward looking (FL) and myopic case (MYP). In the myopic case 
initially consumption and investment, are below the original steady state level and only 
when public capital expands does investment increase while for consumption it takes 6 
periods to achieve a positive proportionate change. Of course, consumption and 
investment in both models finally converge to the same steady state equilibrium. In the 
new steady state, as intuitively we would expect, regardless of dynamic structure, both 
myopic and forward looking model must reach the same long-run equilibrium11.  
 
The main difference between the myopic and forward looking cases is in the adjustment 
towards the new steady state. Consumption in the myopic model is determined, period 
by period, by current household income. This decreases in the initial periods because 
nominal wages fall and the income from physical assets dramatically decline. Private 
capital initially falls as a result of disinvestment generated by the falling capital rental 
rate.  
 
In the forward looking model, consumers base consumption decisions on expected 
future income and in the dynamic path there is no fixed link between consumption and 
current income.  Investment is determined by profit expectations which are stimulated 
by the amplification effect of the increase in public capital stock. So, consumers and 
producers expect, from the outset, a positive stimulus due to the output effect that arises 
when public capital accumulates over time, as discussed above.  
 
Results under different levels of the crowding out parameter   
 
We study also the short-run and long-run responses of key economic variables under 
different levels of the crowding out parameter   and the results  are reported in Table 3. 
For all levels of   (except 1 ) the change in output is negative in the short-run 
however positive in the long-run. When 1 , we get the highest impact since in this 
situation public capital is considered non rival and non- excludable. By increasing   the 
                                                             
11 This particular outcome has not always been recognised in CGE models; see Lecca et al. (2010).  
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negative impact on the short-run level of output is reduced while in the long-run the 
positive impact on output rises. Of course these results were expected given that by 
raising the level of publicness of public capital the greater is the response of private 
factors to the stimulus to public investment. The supply side multiplier rises, increasing 
labour input and capital stock and simultaneously offsetting the adverse effect of 
additional taxation.  
 
Turning to consider consumption and investment, in the long-run even for the lowest 
level of   the proportionate changes in investment are positive whilst consumption is 
crowding in only for 1.0 . In the short-run, instead, consumption and investment fall 
for the lowest level of   but they both become positive for 2.0 .  
 
7. A simultaneous increase in current and capital government expenditure 
 
We run the simulation by setting the congestion parameter equal to 0.5 and assuming 
perfect substitution between private and public consumption (  ). Results for the 
short-run and long-run are reported in the last column of Table 2.  
 
The balanced-budget output and employment multiplier are positive both in the short 
and long run. Initially, government investment works like basic government purchases, 
labour input increases slightly, in turn lowering unemployment and rising real wages. 
There is also absorption of private resources reflected in the decline of private 
consumption and a slight decrease in private investment. Indeed, a permanent increase 
in government purchases (which is the dominant effect in this time frame) has a 
negative wealth effect on private individuals and despite the increase in employment 
and output, the drop in marginal product of private capital, due to a relatively dramatic 
increase in the replacement cost of capital, does not stimulate additional demand side 
expansionary effects and furthermore the fixed capacity prevents potential multiplier 
effects, so the effect is a decline in private investment.  
 
The drain of private resources is only temporary as far as investment is concerned. In 
fact, during the transition path one more effect comes into play, which is, however, not 
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able wholly to counteract the negative wealth effect of an increase in government 
purchase on private consumption. But the accumulation of public capital, although 
adjusted for congestion, has a positive impact on private investment. In the long-run 
investment is 0.03% above its initial steady state but consumption still remains crowded 
out, coming to rest at 0.22% below its benchmark value.  
 
It is interesting to analyse the impact of relaxing the constraint imposed by the UK 
Government on the split between capital and current expenditure. This allows the 
Scottish Government to choose the optimal share between the two categories of 
expenditure, to avoid crowding out effects on private resources. It turns out that in order 
to avoid the crowding out effect on private consumption the share of the budget 
spending allocated to current expenditure should be dropped to circa 60% (from the 
actual 88%) and consequently the share of public investment should increase from 12% 
to 40%. The level of shares necessary to avoid crowding out would change if, for 
example, we allow consumers to value current government expenditure.  
 
If government purchases enter in the consumer‟s utility function, even with a high 
elasticity of substitution, (ε), private consumption goes up immediately. The parameter 
that governs the magnitude of the congestion effect has very little impact in this case 
and even with 1  crowding out effects on consumption are still apparent. 
 
8. Conclusions  
 
The aim of the paper is to evaluate and quantify the impact of endowing the Scottish 
Parliament with greater tax varying power given current debate on greater fiscal 
autonomy in Scotland and UK. To this end we we carry out a number of experiments 
using an intertemporal CGE model for Scotland.  
 
Broadly speaking, the numerical simulations suggest that, in particular circumstances, 
there may be important potential welfare benefits to Scotland by endowing the Scottish 
parliament with greater tax varying powers.  
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Similarly to the analytical findings found in Linnemann and Schabert (2004) if private 
and current public spending are perfect substitutes (  ) we have crowding out, 
whilst if the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution is sufficiently low (the case 
for 20 . ) an increase in government purchases is able to raise the marginal utility of 
consumption so as to outweigh the adverse effect of the increase in income tax rate.  
 
The impact of an unanticipated public capital expenditure shock under perfect foresight, 
in the short and in the long-run, has a positive effect on private consumption and 
investment.  The short-run dramatically diverges for the case in which agents have 
myopic expectations, under which circumstances there is complete crowding out. 
 
From the sensitivity analysis we have performed we can conclude that independently of 
the magnitude of congestion, in the long-run the balanced budget output and 
employment multipliers are positive, with private consumption and investment 
crowded-in. However, the short-run response can be sensitive to the congestion 
parameter. For very low level of congestion parameter, results suggest crowding out 
effects on consumption and investment whilst for a large level only with myopic agents 
does crowding out arise. This result to some extent confirms previous analyses of public 
investment. For example in Baxter and King (1993), even with a low level of 
productivity of public capital the long-run effect of public investment on output is 
positive.       
 
Our analysis also has implications for the debate related to the breakdown between 
government current and capital expenditure. At present the Scottish Government does 
not have total control over the two types of expenditure. Fiscal autonomy without total 
discretionary, over the composition of spending might not achieve the desired effect as 
far as the Scottish Parliament is concerned. Furthermore, current constraints on the 
composition of public expenditure may prevent the regional government from achieving 
higher levels of output and employment.  
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Table 1 
Short-run and long-run results for key variables. Current expenditure shock. Percentage 
change with respect to the initial steady state. 
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Key parameters
Time SR LR SR LR SR LR
Income tax 1.33 1.53 2.15 2.61 2.83 3.57
Gross Domestic Product 0.15 0.27 0.03 -0.27 -0.06 -0.75
Consumer Price Index 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.08
Unemployment Rate -1.70 0.00 -0.40 0.00 0.67 0.00
Total Employment 0.23 0.29 0.06 -0.25 -0.09 -0.72
Nominal Gross Wage 0.53 0.30 0.45 0.51 0.39 0.70
Nominal Wage after Tax 0.30 0.03 0.08 0.06 -0.10 0.08
Real Gross Wage 0.43 0.27 0.42 0.46 0.42 0.62
Real Wage after Tax 0.19 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.07 0.00
Replacment cost of capital 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.06
Working population 0.00 0.29 0.00 -0.25 0.00 -0.72
Households Consumption 0.77 0.81 -0.18 -0.22 -0.96 -1.12
Government Consumption 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10
Private Investment 0.56 0.23 -0.43 -0.33 -1.28 -0.82
Public investment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Output
Agriculture -0.06 -0.05 -0.09 -0.55 -0.11 -0.99
Mining -0.33 -0.33 -0.30 -0.77 -0.28 -1.16
Manufacturing -0.26 -0.59 -0.24 -1.19 -0.22 -1.72
Energy -0.03 0.08 -0.07 -0.44 -0.10 -0.90
Construction -0.01 0.05 -0.15 -0.46 -0.27 -0.91
Distribution 0.17 0.47 -0.20 -0.41 -0.51 -1.18
Transport -0.07 0.16 -0.19 -0.49 -0.29 -1.07
Financial -0.05 0.18 -0.10 -0.42 -0.14 -0.94
Public admin 0.98 1.03 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.93
Education 0.69 0.87 0.54 0.59 0.41 0.34
Other services 0.02 0.32 -0.15 -0.32 -0.28 -0.88
Total Export (RUK+ROW)
Agriculture -0.28 -0.19 0.03 -0.33 0.28 -0.45
Mining -0.40 -0.30 -0.33 -0.51 -0.28 -0.70
Manufacturing -0.38 -0.74 -0.25 -1.27 -0.14 -1.74
Energy -0.32 -0.11 0.01 -0.19 0.28 -0.26
Construction -0.59 -0.22 -0.14 -0.38 0.25 -0.52
Distribution -1.23 -0.31 -0.17 -0.53 0.71 -0.73
Transport -0.60 -0.30 -0.24 -0.51 0.06 -0.70
Financial -0.56 -0.25 -0.07 -0.42 0.35 -0.58
Public admin -1.62 -0.25 -1.52 -0.43 -1.43 -0.58
Education -1.49 -0.43 -1.22 -0.74 -1.01 -1.01
Other services -0.91 -0.34 -0.34 -0.58 0.14 -0.79
ε→∞ε=0.2 ε=2
 
Table 2 
Short-run and long-run results for key variables. Current and capital expenditure shock. 
Percentage change with respect to the initial steady state. 
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Key parameters
Time SR LR SR LR
Income tax 1.94 0.47 2.56 2.34
Gross Domestic Product -0.03 0.65 0.04 0.09
Consumer Price Index 0.05 -0.10 0.04 0.03
Unemployment Rate 0.51 0.00 -0.38 0.00
Total Employment -0.07 0.45 0.10 0.10
Nominal Gross Wage 0.33 -0.02 0.53 0.44
Nominal Wage after Tax -0.01 -0.10 0.09 0.03
Real Gross Wage 0.28 0.08 0.49 0.41
Real Wage after Tax -0.06 0.00 0.04 0.00
Replacment cost of capital 0.04 -0.10 0.10 0.06
Working population 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.10
Households Consumption 0.17 0.39 -0.23 -0.22
Government Consumption 0.00 0.00 1.03 1.03
Private Investment 0.22 0.61 -0.09 0.03
Public investment 12.20 12.20 1.07 1.07
Total Export (RUK+ROW)
Agriculture -0.08 0.79 0.09 0.22
Mining -0.01 0.68 0.00 0.15
Manufacturing -0.14 0.76 -0.15 -0.14
Energy -0.05 0.74 0.07 0.18
Construction -1.13 -0.19 -0.47 -0.18
Distribution -0.47 0.69 0.03 0.01
Transport -0.17 0.68 -0.07 0.03
Financial -0.21 0.44 -0.05 -0.15
Public admin -0.46 2.45 -4.89 -2.76
Education -0.46 1.16 -2.02 -1.31
Other services -0.28 1.01 -0.17 0.00
Capital 
government 
expenditure 
shock
Current and
capital 
government 
expenditure 
shockη =0.5 ε→∞  η =0.5
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Sensitivity analysis: changing the congestion parameter. Short-run and long-run 
percentage change from initial steady-state 
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Congestion
SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR
GDP -0.046 0.174 -0.042 0.304 -0.033 0.534 -0.024 0.766 -0.014 1.041 0.000 1.416
Consumption -0.192 -0.131 -0.093 0.011 0.081 0.263 0.256 0.516 0.463 0.816 0.744 1.225
Investment -0.001 0.150 0.047 0.277 0.160 0.501 0.291 0.727 0.460 0.996 0.703 1.361
1.000.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Shadow price and replacement cost of capital.  
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Figure 3 
Labour market dynamic 
 
Figure 4 
32 
 
Consumption, Investment and Income tax evolution. 
 
 
Figure 5 
Myopic vs. forward looking: private consumption and investment.  
 
